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chapter 14
Postscript to “Why truth-makers”
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of 
my “Why truth-makers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true prop-
ositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer 
Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to 
Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).
1.
In §1 of her paper Hornsby writes that I express my premise that truth is grounded 
in various ways. One of these, which she calls ‘(G2)’, is this:
 (G2) Th e truth of <the rose is red> is explained [/determined] by the 
rose’s being red.
When she later on refers to (G2), she refers mainly to the formulation in terms of 
‘explained by’. In a footnote Hornsby writes that she is quoting almost verbatim 
as far as possible (2005: 34 n.3). Now although I said that one explains the truth 
of <the rose is red> in terms of the rose’s being red, I did not mean this to be a 
way of expressing the idea that truth is grounded. Indeed I made this claim about 
explanation in the paragraph preceding the one where I say there are many ways 
of expressing the idea that truth is grounded (this vol., Ch. 13, 231). What I had in 
mind is that this fact about explanation is a consequence of the fact that the truth 
of <the rose is red> is determined by the rose’s being red. But the idea that truth 
is grounded does not consist in, nor is it constituted by, the fact about explana-
tion. But I acknowledge that I was not explicit on this, and that even if I made 
my statement about explanation in a diff erent paragraph from the one where I 
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introduce several ways of expressing the idea that truth is grounded, this may not 
have been enough to prevent confusion.
Anyway, Hornsby contrasts (G2) with what she calls ‘(G1)’:
 (G1) <the rose is red> is true because the rose is red.
And then she makes some curious remarks. For instance, she writes that (G2) 
would seem to be what I need, given that my target is the claim that truth is 
grounded in entities. For she writes that in my view ‘the rose’s being red’ denotes 
a truth-maker and the “nice thing about (G2)” from my point of view, she writes, 
is that it appears explicitly to mention such an entity. But (G1) does not mention 
any entity, at least aft er the ‘because’ (2005: 35).
If my project had been to show that language commits us to certain entities, 
then perhaps I would have needed (G2). Th en I could have argued that the refer-
ence to an entity by ‘the rose’s being red’ is ineliminable and so that (G2) commits 
us to certain entities, the truth-makers. But that was not my project. My project 
was not to reach ontological conclusions by exposing a fragment of language 
that reveals ontology. My project was to reach ontological conclusions through 
a diff erent kind of argument. In particular, I wanted to give an argument that if 
truth is grounded, then it is grounded in entities. And (G1) expresses the idea that 
truth is grounded as well as (G2). Th is is why I used (G1). And as Hornsby recog-
nizes, I used mainly (G1). And the reason why I used mainly (G1) was precisely 
that ‘the rose is red’ does not mention any entity and therefore no one should think 
that I am arguing for the existence of truth-makers from the fact that there is a 
phrase that appears to mention them!
Hornsby writes that (G2) exhibits ontology if I am right, that my opponent holds 
that (G1) “gives the lie” to the idea that ontology is exhibited, and that a question 
that separates me from my opponents is which of these approximately equivalent 
formulations to put one’s money on (ibid.: 36). But this is not the right diagnosis of 
the dialectical situation. Th e issue is not one about choosing between two formu-
lations of one idea, one that exhibits ontology and the other that does not. As I just 
said, I worked mainly with the formulation that Hornsby says my opponents claim 
not to exhibit ontology, namely (G1). So the issue between my opponents and me 
is not one about which one of those formulations we should prefer. Th e issue is 
whether one can account for what makes true that, say, the rose is red, in terms of 
how the rose is or whether one must postulate some entities to account for that.
In §1.2 Hornsby writes that ‘the truth of <the rose is red>’ might be thought 
to denote a state of aff airs additional to any to which someone who says that the 
rose is red is committed, or it might be thought simply to denote the same state 
of aff airs as ‘the rose’s being red’ does (ibid.: 36). Hornsby is right to say that I do 
not endorse the second alternative. But on the fi rst alternative, Hornsby writes, a 
proposition’s truth is an entity diff erent from that which makes the proposition 
true. One then appears to be committed to “an unending hierarchy of truth-
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makers in respect of each proposition: the truth of <p>, the truth of <<p> is true>, 
the truth of <<<p> is true> is true>, and so on” (ibid.).
Hornsby thinks there are ways out of this unending hierarchy. She thinks that by 
simply denying that ‘the truth of <the rose is red>’ denotes I could accord unequal 
treatment to ‘the truth of <the rose is red>’ and ‘the rose’s being red’. Th en she 
writes that I would “acknowledge that fi nding a nominalization in an approximate 
equivalent of a sentence doesn’t in general reveal an ontology to which one would 
be committed by affi  rming the corresponding proposition” and that I would prob-
ably acknowledge also that “no general support for [the claim that truth is grounded 
in entities] can be made with the claim [truth is grounded]” (ibid.). Yes, I would 
happily acknowledge the things Hornsby says I would. But I never said or thought 
that a nominalization would in general reveal the ontological commitments of the 
propositions, so I never thought that that truth is grounded could give support to 
the idea that truth is grounded in entities in that way. Only in the context of an argu-
ment, like the one I presented in §7 of “Why truth-makers”, can the claim that truth 
is grounded give support to the idea that truth is grounded in entities.
Anyway, in a footnote, Hornsby considers something very close to what is 
indeed my line with respect to the problem of the unending hierarchy. She writes 
that I might say that even if the terms ‘the truth of <p>’, ‘the truth of <<p> is true>’ 
and so on do not denote states of aff airs, nonetheless <<p> is true>, <<<p> is 
true> is true> and so on are all grounded in an entity – namely the entity that is 
<p>’s truth-maker (ibid.: 37 n.7). I would indeed say that all those nested prop-
ositions are made true by <p>’s truth-maker. But note that in order to say this it 
is not necessary, as Hornsby suggests, to deny that ‘the truth of <p>’, ‘the truth of 
<<p> is true>’ and so on denote states of aff airs. One could accept that they denote 
states of aff airs yet maintain that these states of aff airs are not the truth-makers 
of the nested propositions. Th is could be maintained for many diff erent reasons. 
One could maintain that the entity that makes <p> and all the nested propositions 
true is not a state of aff airs, but a trope, say, and that only tropes are truth-makers. 
Or one could maintain that, although some propositions like <p> have states of 
aff airs as truth-makers, not all states of aff airs act as truth-makers. So one could 
maintain that it is the state of aff airs that p that makes <p> and the nested prop-
ositions true and that the states of aff airs referred to by ‘the truth of <p>’, ‘the truth 
of <<p> is true>’ and so on are the truth-makers of no propositions at all.
As I said, I think that the truth-maker of the nested propositions <<p> is true>, 
<<<p> is true> is true> and so on is the truth-maker of <p>. But Hornsby says 
that if this is the line, then in order to determine how terms like ‘the truth of <p>’ 
behave, one will need to decide whether or not <p> has a truth-maker in some 
instance. And, she writes, what we need to be persuaded of in any particular case 
is precisely that <p> has a truth-maker (ibid.: 37 n.7). But I gave an argument that 
<p>, when it is a synthetic proposition like <the rose is red>, has a truth-maker. 
Hornsby is not convinced by this argument, but we shall see below that her criti-
cisms do not go through.
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In §1.3 Hornsby writes that we need to consider whether we are apt to accept 
the existence of truth-makers wherever such claims apply. She wonders whether 
nominalized phrases such as ‘the rose’s not being blue’, ‘the rose’s being red or 
yellow’ and others are all equally good candidates for denoting truth-makers. 
She remembers that there are friends of states of aff airs who doubt the existence 
of negative or disjunctive ones, and so, she writes, they will deny that things such 
as ‘Th e truth of <the rose is not blue> is determined by the rose’s not being blue’ 
and ‘Th e truth of <the rose is red or yellow> is determined by the rose’s being red 
or yellow’ (ibid.: 38).
First, as for negative and disjunctive facts, nothing in “Why truth-makers” 
commits me to their existence, or to the thesis that if they exist, they are the truth-
makers of disjunctive or negative propositions. All my paper commits me to is that 
disjunctive and negative propositions such as <the rose is red or yellow> and <the 
rose is not blue> have some truth-maker: but that truth-maker might be, say, the 
non-disjunctive and non-negative fact that the rose is red. Note that I am not now 
claiming that the fact that the rose is red is the truth-maker of <the rose is red or 
yellow> and <the rose is not blue>. What I am saying is that this view is consistent 
with the thesis argued for and defended in “Why truth-makers”. My thesis was that 
all the propositions in a certain class of synthetic propositions have truth-makers, 
not that each one of those propositions has its own distinctive truth-maker.
Let me now make a more general point. Hornsby’s method in these passages 
consists in seeing whether we are disposed to assent to instances like ‘Th e truth of 
<the rose is not blue> is determined by the rose’s not being blue’ and ‘Th e truth of 
<the rose is red or yellow> is determined by the rose’s being red or yellow’. I reject 
this method from the very beginning. What if we are not disposed to assent to 
some or all of these instances? What if we are disposed to assent to some or all of 
these instances? Nothing of ontological interest follows from this. Our disposi-
tions to assent or dissent tell us nothing about whether the world really contains 
entities that act as truth-makers. Th us such dispositions are not ontologically 
revealing. Such dispositions can only tell us about our intuitions and so they can 
only tell us about us. And of course my method in “Why truth-makers” was not 
to prove that there are truth-makers via establishing that we would assent to 
linguistic instances of any sort.
2.
In §6 of “Why truth-makers” I put forward an argument for truth-makers based 
on the claim that truth is grounded. Th e argument, very roughly put, consists in 
showing that since there are many ways the rose is, one cannot account for what 
makes true that the rose is red without reifying those ways the rose is. At one 
point in the course of that argument I challenged my opponents to explain what it 
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means, or what it consists in, that for the rose to instantiate the property of being 
red is not for it to instantiate the property of being light. Th e challenge consists in 
explaining that without reifying ways things are.
Hornsby writes that it is obvious that for the rose to instantiate the property of 
being red is not for it to instantiate the property of being light, and that it is also 
obvious what this means. She says that given a conception of properties we know 
that for any object to instantiate the property of being red is for that object to be 
red, and that for it to instantiate the property of being light is for it to be light; and 
we know that what it is for an object to be red is not what it is for it to be light 
(2005: 41).
First, a preliminary comment. Hornsby says that given a conception of proper-
ties we know that for any object to instantiate the property of being red is for it to 
be red. But it is the other way around. For a conception of properties is supposed 
to explain what it is for an object to be red. So, in any case, what one should say 
is that given a conception of properties one knows that for any object to be red is 
for it to instantiate the property of being red.
Secondly, but more importantly, the challenge consisted in explaining what 
it means, or what it consists in, that for the rose to instantiate the property of 
being red is not for it to instantiate the property of being light without reifying the 
rose’s instantiation of the properties of being red and being light. Nothing in what 
Hornsby writes meets this challenge.
Saying that it is obvious that what it is for an object to be red is not for it to be 
light clearly does not meet the challenge. Could saying that being red and being 
light consists, respectively, in instantiating diff erent properties meet the chal-
lenge? Not on the face of it. One has to explain how having the property of being 
red is not having the property of being light without reifying the having of proper-
ties. I considered certain ways of doing this in the context of trying to account for 
what makes true that the rose is red and I argued they were not satisfactory. But 
Hornsby provides no way of doing that. So far, the challenge remains unmet.
3.
In §3 of her reply Hornsby turns to my main argument for truth-makers, namely:
 (1) Truth is grounded.
 (2) Grounding is a relation.
 (3) Relations link entities.
 (4) Th erefore, truth is grounded in entities.
She writes that one is entitled to (2) only if a relation is employed in the proper 
explication of (1). And she says that in §1 of her reply she gave reasons for 
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doubting whether any relations are introduced in the spellings out of (1) I off ered 
(2005: 41).
No reasons were needed to show that I did not introduce any relations when 
I spelled out (1), for introducing relations at that stage was never my intention. I 
argued for (2) in §7 of my paper.
Anyway, Hornsby does not explain why one is entitled to (2) only if a relation 
is employed in the proper explication of (1). But surely this is not true. Imagine 
someone arguing like this: (A) Hector is a Trojan; (B) Being a Trojan consists 
in having a property; (C) Th erefore, Hector has a property. And now imagine 
someone objecting to this argument on the basis that one is entitled to (B) only if 
a property is employed or introduced in the proper explication of (A). Surely the 
objector would be missing the nature of this argument. Hornsby is missing the 
nature of my argument in the same way.
Perhaps by ‘proper explication’ Hornsby understands ‘complete explication’ 
and by completely explicating that truth is grounded Hornsby understands some-
thing that includes explaining or at least mentioning everything about grounding. 
Th en one would be entitled to (2) only if a relation appeared in the proper explica-
tion of (1). But if this is what ‘proper explication’ means I did not need to ‘prop-
erly explicate’ the claim that truth is grounded in order to establish it. So, once 
established, I could go on to establish (2), which is what I did.
4.
In §4.1 Hornsby writes that it is true of any proposition <p> that while <p> is true 
because p, it is not that p because <p> is true (2005: 42). I disagree. Th is is not 
true of any propositions since the truth-teller is an exception, as I pointed out in 
§5 of “Why truth-makers”. But what Hornsby says is true of any proposition is 
instead true of a signifi cant class of synthetic propositions about things like roses 
and non-truth-bearers in general.
Hornsby writes that I do not think that this asymmetry can be explained by the 
fact that instances of ‘<p> is true because p’ involve us in semantic descent, whereas 
instances of ‘p because <p> is true’ do not. Th is is true: I do not believe that.
Hornsby suggests that whatever explanation I give of why <p> is true because 
p, while it is not the case that p because <p> is true, should work along the same 
lines of the explanation of why {a} has an F-member because a is F while it is not 
the case that a is F because {a} has an F-member.
Note that this assumes that the ‘because’ is the same in the case of the truth of <p> 
as in the case of the F-ness of the member of {a}. Th is assumption deserves serious 
discussion, but for reasons of space I shall assume it without proper discussion.
Now if the ‘because’ is the same then of course I take it to be a relation, and 
then {a} has an F-member because of a certain entity. Th is entity cannot be a, at 
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least if F is a contingent property of a. It must be either the fact that a is F, or some 
other entity apt to fi t the role in question. (And, although it does not follow, it 
is plausible to suppose that that entity is as well the truth-maker of <a is F>.) So 
(assuming the ‘because’ is the same in both cases) Hornsby’s natural idea that the 
explanations should work along the same lines is satisfi ed: they do.
In §4.2 Hornsby gives her own explanation of why <p> is true because p but 
not vice versa. She writes:
sometimes it is no good answering the question Why s? by saying 
because t unless s’s being the case requires something more than t’s 
being the case. To take the example of concern here – its being the 
case that <p> is true requires more (in the sense elicited) than that p 
should be the case; and it is no good answering the question Why p? 
by saying because <p> is true, even though one may answer the ques-
tion Why is <p> true? by saying because p. (2005: 44)
First, although Hornsby writes that in some cases (“sometimes”) one should not 
answer Why s? by saying because t unless s’s being the case requires something 
more than t’s being the case, she does not say why saying that p because <p> is 
true is one of those cases.
Furthermore Hornsby assumes but does not explain why that <p> is true 
requires more than what that p requires. She says that for the rose to be red it is 
not required that there should be anything meaningful to say or to think, and that 
it is not required that the proposition that the rose is red should be propounded 
(ibid.: 43). True, for the rose to be red it is not required that the proposition that 
the rose is red should be propounded. But that the rose is red requires that there 
be something meaningful that can be said or thought, namely the proposition 
that the rose is red. For if the rose is red, then the proposition that the rose is 
red is true, and therefore the proposition exists. So, necessarily the rose is red if 
and only if the proposition that the rose is red is true. And so, that the rose is red 
requires that the proposition be true no less than that that the proposition is true 
requires that the rose be red.
5.
Hornsby sees a tension in my thought about truth-makers. For, she writes, on 
the one hand, I call them entities, I speak of our need of reifying some features 
of reality and I shrink from saying that any old sentence nominalization denotes 
such a thing. On the other hand, Hornsby says, my main argument for the exist-
ence of truth-makers “can seem to show that every proposition has a truthmaker”. 
For, Hornsby says, I believe the existence of truth-makers is required to explain 
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the correctness of the schema ‘<p> is true because p’ and “in any instance of this 
schema, one might simply nominalize the sentence that expresses <p> to say what 
<p>’s truthmaker is” (2005: 45). Hornsby proposes to relieve this tension by using 
nominalizations but refusing to claim that their denotations exist (ibid.: 46).
But there is no need to relieve a tension that does not exist. For, as I have already 
said, I reject the idea that any nominalization of the sentence that expresses <p> 
gives us the truth-maker of <p>. Nothing in the argument of “Why truth-makers” 
suggests or implies that any sentence nominalization gives us the truth-maker 
of the propositions expressed by the sentence. All the argument claims is that 
if certain true propositions are grounded, then given that grounding is a rela-
tion and that relations link entities, those grounded propositions are grounded 
in entities. All this is consistent with the nominalization ‘the rose’s not being blue’ 
not giving us the truth-maker of <the rose is not blue>. As I said before, this could 
be the fact that the rose is not blue, but it could also be the fact that the rose is red, 
or the red trope of the rose, or the rose itself if it is necessarily red, or whatever 
entity metaphysicians might discover play the role of truth-makers. Th e nominal-
ization ‘the rose’s not being blue’ does not settle the issue of what the truth-maker 
of <the rose is not blue> is – nor did I ever suggest it did.
6.
Dodd (2007) thinks the idea that grounding is a relation can be accommodated 
without thereby admitting truth-makers. Taking inspiration from Russell’s theory 
of judgement, Dodd claims that it may well be correct to think of grounding as a 
relation, but it does not follow that it is a relation between a true proposition and 
a truth-maker, since it could be a relation of a true proposition to several objects 
(ibid.: 398). Th us, according to Dodd, for the true proposition <a is F> to be 
grounded is not for a binary relation to obtain between it and its truth-maker but 
for <a> to refer to a, <F> to express F, and for a to instantiate F. “Th e obtaining of 
any grounding relation consists in the obtaining of sub-sentential thought/world 
relations and the fact that the object instantiates the property” (ibid.).
But this is not very clear. Dodd starts by saying that although grounding is a 
relation it may well be a relation between a proposition and several objects: but 
what are those objects? He does not say. He singles out a and F as relata of certain 
relations but they are not singled out as relata of a relation linking them to the 
proposition <a is F> but of two diff erent relations linking them to <a> and <F>. 
True, he says that the grounding relation, one of whose relata is the proposition 
<a is F>, consists in these other relations obtaining. Perhaps he means that <a 
is F> is grounded by being related to a and F. But this cannot be true since the 
groundedness of a proposition <p> consists in that <p> is true because p, but 
it makes no sense to say that <a is F> is true because a and F. Th is is, perhaps, 
GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA
250
why Dodd writes that for <a is F> to be grounded is for <a> to refer to a, <F> to 
express F, and for a to instantiate F. But this still does not tell us to which objects 
<a is F> is related by the grounding relation; unless, of course, he means that there 
are three such objects: a, F and a’s instantiating F. But this would be to posit a 
truth-maker, and it would make it unnecessary to include the non-truth-makers 
a and F among the relata of the grounding relation. Clearly, this is not what Dodd 
wanted to mean. But it is not easy to see what else what he writes could mean.
7.
Dodd argues that the asymmetry of the dependence between truth and reality 
(namely that, in general, while truth depends on reality, reality does not depend 
on truth) is a conceptual rather than a modal-existential asymmetry. Th is means, 
according to Dodd, that ‘<a is F> is true because a is F’ is true because ‘because’ 
signals that what follows it is claimed to be conceptually more basic than what 
precedes it, and this is indeed the case (2007: 398–9). Similarly, according to this 
explanation, what explains why ‘a is F because <a is F> is true’ is false is that what 
follows the ‘because’ is not conceptually more basic than what precedes it. According 
to Dodd, that a is F is conceptually more basic than that <a is F> is true because the 
identity of <a is F> is partially determined by the items to which its constituents 
refer, and so one can understand what is required for <a is F> to be true, namely that 
a be F, by engaging in semantic descent and ceasing to talk of propositions, while 
semantic ascent from ‘a is F’ to ‘<a is F> is true’ introduces a concept, namely that of 
a proposition, which was not in use before the ascent took place (ibid.: 399–400).
Provided ‘F’ can be understood without understanding the concept of prop-
osition (and truth, let us add), then there seems to be the asymmetry mentioned 
by Dodd.1 But I fail to see what such an asymmetry has to do with the asymmetry 
that consists in that a’s being F determines that <a is F> is true but that <a is F> is 
true does not determine that a is F. Dodd may have accounted for an asymmetry 
concerning truth but he has not shown that he has accounted for the asymmetry 
that needed accounting for. And it is diffi  cult to see how he could do that, since 
the fact that to understand the concept of the proposition that a is F one needs to 
understand what a and F are, but to understand that a is F one does not need to 
understand the concept of the proposition that a is F is perfectly compatible with 
(the falsity) that while a is F because <a is F> is true, it is not the case that <a is 
F> is true because a is F.2
Notes
 1. I owe the important proviso in the antecedent to David Liggins. 
 2. Th anks to David Liggins for discussion.
